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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-1046 
___________ 
 
STEVEN A. JOHNSON, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN BIG SANDY USP 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-16-cv-01044) 
District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones III 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 17, 2017 
Before:  MCKEE, JORDAN, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 7, 2017) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Steven A. Johnson, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from orders of 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania rejecting his  
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and denying his motion for 
reconsideration.  Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 On January 14, 2012, while Johnson was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional 
Institution near Milan, Michigan (FCI-Milan), he was issued an incident report charging 
him with insolence.  Johnson was advised of a hearing on the charge, and he waived his 
right to staff representation.  A disciplinary hearing officer (DHO) found Johnson guilty, 
based in part on Johnson’s statement at the hearing that “[he] gave the officer a direct 
order to suck [his] dick.”  Doc. No. 11-1 at 27.  The DHO sanctioned Johnson with the 
loss of 14 days of good conduct time and a suspended sentence to time in disciplinary 
segregation.  Johnson did not file an appeal to the Regional Director of the Bureau of 
Prisons (“BOP”).  
 On March 13, 2012, while Johnson was incarcerated at the United States 
Penitentiary near Inez, Kentucky (USP-Big Sandy), he was issued an incident report 
charging him with assault.  Johnson was advised of a hearing on the charge, and he 
waived his right to staff representation.  A DHO officer found Johnson guilty of 
attempted assault, based on Johnson’s admission at the hearing that he “tried to spit on a 
[correctional officer].”  Doc. No. 11-1 at 35.  The DHO sanctioned Johnson with the loss 
of 27 days of good conduct time, a 15-day disciplinary segregation sentence, and six 
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months loss of commissary privileges.  Johnson did not file an appeal to the Regional 
Director of the BOP. 
 In May 2016, Johnson filed a petition under § 2241 alleging that his due process 
rights were violated in connection with the disciplinary hearings, and seeking restoration 
of good conduct time.1  The District Court dismissed the petition, holding that Johnson 
had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and that his claim was inexcusably 
procedurally defaulted.  Johnson timely appealed but also filed a timely motion for 
reconsideration, which the District Court denied.  Johnson filed an amended notice of 
appeal.2  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii).     
 A § 2241 petition is the appropriate vehicle for raising constitutional claims when 
a prison disciplinary proceeding results in the loss of good conduct time.  See Queen v. 
Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008).  A federal prisoner must exhaust his 
administrative remedies before petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241.  
See Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996).  Proper 
exhaustion requires that a petitioner assert an issue or claim at every administrative level.  
Id. at 761.  Pursuant to BOP regulations, a federal prisoner found guilty at a DHO hearing 
                                              
1 Johnson has been incarcerated, since the time of filing, at the United States Penitentiary 
in Waymart, PA (USP-Canaan), which is located in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 
And though Johnson named the custodian of USP-Big Sandy in Kentucky as the 
defendant in his petition, the petition was properly brought in the Middle District, which 
is where his custodian was at the time of filing.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2242, 2243.   
 
2 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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may appeal the decision to the Regional Director, who must respond within 30 days of 
the appeal’s filing.  28 C.F.R. §§ 542.14(d)(2); 542.18.  Following the Regional 
Director’s denial, an inmate may appeal to the General Counsel in the Central Office.  
§ 542.15(a).  “Appeal to the General Counsel is the final administrative appeal.”  Id.   
 We agree with the District Court that Johnson failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies because he did not seek Regional Director or Central Office review.  Because 
the time for seeking any such review has expired, Johnson’s claim is procedurally 
defaulted.  Moscato, 98 F.3d at 760.  Therefore, judicial review is barred unless he can 
demonstrate cause and prejudice.  Id. at 761-62.   
 Johnson attempted to make that showing by arguing that both the Regional 
Director and the Central Office had ignored some of his prior (unrelated) appeals, which 
shows that no effective administrative remedy exists.  But the failure to respond to a 
previous appeal does not excuse Johnson from exhausting his administrative remedies 
now.  Indeed, the regulations provide that “[i]f the inmate does not receive a response 
within the time allotted for reply . . . the inmate may consider the absence of a response 
to be a denial at that level.”  § 542.18; see also Moscato, 98 F.3d at 762 (concluding that 
there was no cause for default of administrative remedies where petitioner failed to allege 
any “external impediment” to filing a timely appeal).  Johnson therefore failed to 
demonstrate cause for his failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  Finally, we 
conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson’s motion 
for reconsideration, wherein he again alleged that the failure to exhaust should be 
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excused by the failure of the Regional Director and the Central Office to respond to his 
previous appeals.  See Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673, 677 (3d Cir. 
1999) (describing proper grounds for a motion for reconsideration).   
 There being no substantial question presented on appeal, we will summarily affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
